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“The Death of Sympathy.” Coal Mining, Workplace 
Hazards, and the Politics of Risk in Britain,  
ca. 1970-1990 
Jörg Arnold ∗ 
Abstract: »Das Ende des Mitleids. Steinkohlebergbau, Gefahren am Arbeits-
platz und Risikopolitik in Großbritannien, ca. 1970-1990«. This article employs 
the concept of risk as a lens through which to explore discursive constructions 
of the nature of coal mining and coal miners in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Drawing on a diverse primary source base, ranging from songs and poetry to 
parliamentary debates and government files, it contextualises and refines la-
bour historian Dick Geary’s observation about the “death of sympathy” for the 
miners in the coal strike of 1984/85. It argues that over the course of the peri-
od, coal miners turned from an object of risk into its subject; they were trans-
formed, in political discourse, from heroes and victims into enemies of the state 
and society. Although the notion that coal miners were a “special case” on ac-
count of the hazardous working conditions in which they laboured, continued 
to resonate in popular culture throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the political 
bargaining power of the “blood on the coal” argument became progressively 
eroded after its successful application in the strikes of 1972 and 1974. By the 
time of the strike of 1984/85, Conservative opponents of the miners’ cause had 
turned the argument on its head: The very hazardous working conditions were 
taken as proof of an obstinate refusal of the industry to go with the times. The 
real danger, they argued, were not health hazards, but the miners themselves. 
Keywords: Coal mining, health hazards, cultural representations of coal strikes 
of 1972, 1974 and 1984/5, coal miner as hero, coal miner as enemy. 
1.  Introduction1 
In a famous essay published in the aftermath of the Great Miners’ Strike of 
1984/85, the British Marxist historian Raphael Samuel speculated that 
the willingness of the miners to risk their all in the strike […] might be 
thought to have some ultimate origin […] with the peculiarities of an industry 
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on which the face worker is engaged, in the last analysis, in a daily wager with 
death (Samuel 1986, 9).  
Samuel looked towards workplace hazards in order to understand the remarka-
ble resilience shown by mining communities across Britain’s coalfields during 
twelve long months of struggle against pit closures. In so doing, he tapped into 
a rich cultural tradition that depicted the figure of the coal miner as distinct 
from other types of manual workers.2 According to this tradition, the coal min-
er was uniquely endangered by the environment in which he worked. While his 
work was dangerous, it was also essential for society at large, for “our civilisa-
tion,” as George Orwell famously put it in 1937, “is founded on coal” (Orwell 
2001, 18). The coal miner’s very willingness to engage “in a daily wager with 
death” made him deserving of both sympathy and admiration. Yet this special 
status also made him potentially dangerous to the status quo, as Orwell evoca-
tively recognised when he juxtaposed the notion of “poor drudges under-
ground” with the dynamic image of “shovels [being driven] forward with arms 
and belly muscles of steel” (Orwell 2001, 30 et seq.). If the “poor drudges” 
only came to realise the extent of their power, would they not hold it in their 
hands to change “our civilisation” beyond recognition, just as the Morlocks in 
H. G. Wells’ celebrated short story “The Time Machine” (1895) had done in an 
imaginary future (Wells 2005)? 
This paper is interested in the intersection between broader discursive con-
structions of the coal miner and the political struggles over the future of the 
British coal industry in the 1970s and 1980s. It traces contrasting narratives of 
risk in British public discourse and links them to social conditions. It assesses 
the uses that were made of these narratives in the political arena, and by whom. 
The discursive constructions were informed by three different understandings 
of risk. First, there were risks in the sense of hazards to which the miners them-
selves were exposed in their work – the “daily wager with death” of which 
Samuel speaks, often expressed through the phrase “blood on the coal.” Sec-
ond, risks were defined as the danger that the coal miners, as organised workers 
with considerable industrial bargaining power, posed themselves to capitalism, 
or in another variant, the UK as a liberal democracy. Finally, risks were defined 
in the sense of the threat that the product of the miners’ labour, the fossil fuel 
coal, presented to the natural environment as a major pollutant.  
This paper draws on a diverse body of primary sources, ranging from cultur-
al artefacts to debates in the House of Commons, from pamphlets and speeches 
to the internal files of the British government. It falls into two parts. Part one 
focuses on two cultural artefacts, a song and a poem, in order to illustrate the 
health hazards facing coal miners and to explore their resonance in popular 
culture. Part two looks in detail at the political debate surrounding competing 
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ideas of risk in relation to the industry. The article builds on, but contextualises 
and refines, an observation by Labour historian Dick Geary about “the death of 
sympathy” for mineworkers in the strike of 1984/85, which, he contends, was 
one of the reasons for the ultimate failure of the strike (Geary 2005, 43). The 
article argues that throughout the 1970s and 1980s, depictions of coal miners as 
heroes deserving of admiration and sympathy persisted in the cultural sphere 
but were progressively marginalised from mainstream political discourse. This 
was partly because the link between cultural representation and actual working 
conditions had become rather tenuous by the early 1980s. But it was also be-
cause the second understanding of risk, according to which the coal miners 
themselves were the real danger, began to overlay the first narrative. Mean-
while, the third understanding about the dangerous environmental impact of 
coal played a marginal role only during the period. It did not displace earlier 
understandings of risk until the turn of the twenty-first century.  
The 1970s and 1980s marked a crucial phase in the history of the British 
coal industry. The period may be characterised as a false dawn that spawned 
hopes and illusions about a bright future for the industry that were soon to be 
disappointed. Yet heightened expectations took on a life of their own, and 
arguably played no small role in accelerating the long-term trajectory of de-
cline and in defining its conflictual nature. The 1970s followed upon years of 
contraction which the preeminent authority on the topic, writing in the early 
1980s, has called “the most difficult time ever known in the coal industry” 
(Ashworth 1986, 324). Between 1958 and 1973, coal’s share in total UK ener-
gy consumption fell from 80 percent to 37 percent (Ashworth 1986, 39). Of the 
six traditional markets for coal – domestic, gas, private industry, railways, steel 
and electricity – the industry lost the first four and came under severe pressure 
in the field of electricity generation by the switch to oil-burn in power stations 
and the nuclear power programme (Robens 1972, 58-87). The scale of the run-
down of coal in the decade preceding the 1970s was indeed remarkable: Be-
tween 1957 and 1970/1, manpower was cut from 700,000 employees to 
287,000, while the number of producing collieries fell from 822 to 292. Mean-
while, total output was reduced by one third, from 227 million tons in 1957 to 
145 million tons in 1970/1 (Ashworth 1986, 672-86). Yet, contraction went 
hand in hand with considerable gains in productivity, due to the wide introduc-
tion of mechanised methods of coal getting.  
By the early 1970s, when the restructuring had been largely completed, 
there were grounds for cautious optimism towards a viable future of deep-coal 
mining in the UK. As the National Coal Board (NCB), the corporation that had 
been created after World War II to run the newly nationalised industry, made 
clear in its annual report for 1970/71, “The industry is now in good shape and 
is increasingly seen to offer a secure and promising future to recruits” (Ash-
worth 1986, 236). Prospects were enhanced further by the oil price shock of 
1973, which saw the price of crude oil rise fourfold, dramatically improving the 
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market position for coal. Together with the transformation in the energy market 
modernisation thus appeared to have created remarkable opportunities for the 
renaissance of an industry that only a few years previously had been considered 
as “condemned to death” (Dennis et al. 1969, 9). And indeed, the tri-partite “Plan 
for Coal” of 1974 was premised on the assumption that in the field of electricity 
generation, coal would enjoy a competitive advantage over oil for the foreseeable 
future. It proposed major new investment and up to 42 million tons of new capac-
ity (Ashworth 1986, 357-63; Department of Energy 1974a, 8). The plan was 
accompanied by a recruitment drive that sought to shed the image of coal as 
obsolete and to lure young men into the industry by promising “big money” 
and “great prospects.”3 King Coal was back in power and was looking towards 
extending his reign well into the twenty-first century. Or so it seemed.  
Yet less than a decade later, by the early 1980s, the optimism had evapo-
rated. The market share of coal was shrinking, permanent productivity gains had 
proved difficult to achieve, and there was developing a serious over-capacity in 
the industry. As the official history summarised the situation in rather understated 
terms, “The current position and immediate prospects of the coal industry […] 
could hardly fail to produce feelings of disappointment” (Ashworth 1986, 430). 
The National Coal Board and its successor after privatisation in 1994, UK 
Coal, announced ever new rounds of closures, this time in the name of cost-
efficiency, but the goal of stabilising the industry on a competitive footing 
proved elusive.4 In early 2015, only three deep-coal mines remained in opera-
tion, employing 2,500 people, around 1 percent of the workforce of the 1970s.5 
By December of the same year, they had closed down as well. 
Related to this volatile trajectory of decline, rejuvenation and reversal was 
an unprecedented upsurge of industrial conflict, with three national disputes in 
little over a decade (1972, 1974 and 1984/85). The National Union of Min-
eworkers (NUM) fought the disputes of the 1970s over the question of wages 
both in absolute and relative terms. The miners demanded substantial pay rises 
of 35 percent to 47 percent in 1972 and of a further 31 percent in 1974 in order 
to come closer to realising NUM president Joe Gormely’s celebrated vision of 
“a nice house […] a good education […] a Jaguar at the front door […] and a 
Mini at the side to take [the] wife shopping” (Gormley 1982, 186). Yet of equal 
importance was the goal of raising the coal miner’s status vis-à-vis other indus-
trial workers by restoring him to the top of the industrial wage table. By com-
parison, in 1984/85 the mineworkers went on strike over the question of securi-
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ty of employment, both for the coalminers themselves and their children’s 
generation. While the NUM was successful in the confrontations of the early 
1970s, it failed to secure any concessions from the management of the Coal 
Board, or indeed any settlement whatsoever, in 1984/85. Despite the differ-
ences in motivation and outcome, the strikes shared in common an unusual 
degree of politicisation. They represented highly symbolic confrontations be-
tween labour, capital and government whose significance extended far beyond 
the immediate issues over which they were fought.  
The trope of “blood on the coal” commanded respect across the political 
spectrum at the beginning of the 1970s, but lost purchase as the decades wore 
on. Supporters of the miners’ cause, hailing from the industrial and political 
wings of the labour movement, invoked it to good effect in the disputes of 1972 
and 1974. Yet, ten years later, by the time of the great miners’ strike, the 
“blood on the coal” argument had become marginalised from the centre of the 
political debate. It became the preserve of radical historians such as Samuel 
and politicians in retirement such as former Conservative Prime Minister Har-
old Macmillan. Meanwhile, at the centre of the decision-making process, in the 
House of Commons, opponents of the miners’ cause from the Conservative 
Party did not just feel confident to dismiss the argument out of hand, but turned 
it on its head; they now cited the very occupational hazards that had been such 
a source of admiration and sympathy as evidence of the miners’ obstinate re-
fusal “to face reality” and to move with the times. While defusing the persua-
sive power of the “blood on the coal” argument, these opponents extolled a 
different kind of risk altogether: They spoke of the danger that the coal miners, 
through their union, posed to the future prosperity, and indeed survival as a 
parliamentary democracy, of the British nation as a whole.  
In short, the paper makes the case for a temporal succession in the salience 
of contrasting narratives of risk, but recognises their considerable overlaps, and 
indeed, spatial variation in British society during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
shift from object to subject of risk, from hero to enemy, can be understood in 
dialectical terms: The very success that the coal miners enjoyed in the struggles 
of the early 1970s reinforced fears about their disruptive power that had been 
lingering just beneath the surface of the sympathy and admiration that they 
commanded. As radical Labour politician Tony Benn observed in a diary entry 
in 1975, “The only time working-class people are allowed to become heroes is 
when they are trapped, dying or dead […] If there is a pit disaster [the miners 
are heroes], if there is a wage claim, they are militants” (Benn 1989, 400, 471). 
2.  “Blood on the Coal” as Cultural Representation  
Of the two narratives of risk, the occupational health hazards facing coal min-
ers resonated more broadly and deeply in British culture. The risks that miners 
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took at work and the very harshness of their lives had been depicted in fiction, 
feature films, autobiographical accounts and popular song. As Beatrix Camp-
bell commented in a critical revisiting of George Orwell’s classic account from 
a feminist perspective in 1984,  
Miners are men’s love object. They bring together all the necessary elements 
of romance […]. That makes them victim and hero at the same time […] – 
they command both protection and admiration. They are represented as beauti-
ful, statuesque, shaded men. The miner’s body is loved in the literature of 
men, because of its work and because it works (Campbell 1984, 97). 
There were two main dangers to which the miner’s body was exposed during 
his work. The first danger was the risk of getting injured or killed by an acci-
dent on the job or an explosion or other calamity in the pit. The second danger 
was the risk of contracting an occupational disease. The precise nature of these 
hazards may be illustrated with the help of two cultural artefacts, a song and a 
poem, written in 1958 and 1985, respectively. Furthermore, a discussion of 
these representations helps to gain insights into the broader societal resonance 
that the heroic image of the coal miner commanded.  
The first artefact is a folk song, “The Ballad of Springhill,” which tells the 
story of a notorious disaster, an underground earthquake in a colliery in the 
mining town of Springhill in 1958. In the incident, two groups of miners could 
be rescued a week after the explosion, but 74 of the 174 miners who were 
trapped underground did not survive (Greene 2003). Although the town of 
Springhill was situated in Nova Scotia, Canada, the incident attracted wide-
spread media attention in the UK and the English-speaking world more gener-
ally at the time. It made a strong impression on English songwriter Ewan Mac-
Coll, who together with American folksinger Peggy Seeger wrote “The Ballad 
of Springhill” in 1958. Thirty years later, the Irish rock band U2 included the 
song in the playlist of their “Joshua tree” world tour. U2 in turn had been in-
spired by a popular rendition of the song by the Irish folksinger Luke Kelly of 
the folk band, The Dubliners.6 
The song is divided into nine stanzas. It opens by setting an elegiac tone 
through establishing a close connection between place, work and death. The 
first stanza reads, “In the town of Springhill, Nova Scotia / Down in the dark of 
the Cumberland Mine / There’s blood on the coal and the miners lie / In the 
roads that never saw sun nor sky / Roads that never saw sun nor sky.” This is a 
story of victimhood, but also of tragic sacrifice: “Bone and blood is the price of 
coal,” stanza two reminds the listeners, hinting at the huge debt that society 
owes to the “barefaced miners” for the labour that they perform (without yet 
feeling the need to spell out the precise nature of this debt – this, after all, is 
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1958 when the dependence of industrial society on coal was still taken for 
granted). There is also a hint of the redemptive power of music in the song – 
when all else fails, “we’ll live on songs and hope instead,” or so the lyrics 
claim in the sixth stanza. But ultimately, this is a song not about rescue and 
salvation, but about the tragic inescapability of death. As the penultimate stan-
za puts it, “Eight days passed and some were rescued / Leaving the dead to lie 
alone / Thru all their lives they dug their grave / Two miles of earth for a mark-
ing stone.” Here, the dead miners almost take on an ontological significance: 
they illustrate the human condition as a whole.  
“The Ballad of Springhill” is but one, albeit prominent example of the im-
portant place that the figure of the coal miner occupied in the “second” English 
folk revival of the late 1950s and early 1960s. This post-war revival shared 
with its inter-war progenitor the aversion to commercialised mass culture, but 
looked towards working-class communities, rather than the peasantry, as the 
wellspring of “natural” folk culture. Coal miners, who were thought to live in 
“occupational communities” in isolated “industrial villages,” commanded par-
ticular interest among the folk revivalists of the post-war period. In many ways, 
the coal miner, more than any other type of industrial worker, appeared to 
embody a fusion of the traditional and the modern, the socially progressive and 
the culturally conservative (Mitchell 2014; Lloyd 1967, 316-411).  
Folk songs were one medium through which the figure of the coal miner en-
tered the popular imagination. There were other channels of diffusion, follow-
ing the conventions of their specific genres, but etching into public conscious-
ness a coherent set of attributes that defined the coal miner and the nature of his 
work. Of particular resonance was a body of writing from the first half of the 
century that was set in Britain’s coalfields and which, by the 1970s, had long 
acquired the status of canonical texts. Among the most influential were the 
novel Sons and Lovers (1913) by D. H. Lawrence, set in Nottinghamshire; How 
Green was my valley (1939) by Richard Llewelyn, set in South Wales; and 
George Orwell’s travelogue The Road to Wigan Pier (1937), which discussed 
conditions in Yorkshire and Lancashire.7 They all traded in images of coal 
mining that stressed the gruelling nature of the miner’s work but also the close-
knitted community life. The classical tradition was supplemented by the work 
of Barry Hines, who followed up on his early success of A Kestrel for a Knave 
(1968), a bleak coming-of-age novel set in a mining village, with two plays for 
television that revolved around life in the Yorkshire coalfield, The Price of 
Coal (Hines 1968, 1979). They were first broadcast on television in 1977 (di-
rected by the young Ken Loach) and appeared in print two years later. Hines’ 
work was inspired by a mining accident at Houghton Main Colliery in June of 
1975, which had killed five miners and seriously injured another. As the sub-
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ject matter of the play indicates, disasters played an important role in the em-
ployment of the miner’s experience. Indeed, the prominence of the pit disaster 
in feature films was such that one historian has claimed that “a mining film 
without a disaster is like a Western without a shoot-out” (Hogenkamp 2005). 
Pit disasters were depicted as collective experiences affecting the entire pit 
village and exposing the vulnerability of the occupational community (Mohun 
2016, in this HSR Special Issue).  
Finally, there were the published autobiographies of miners’ leaders. These 
texts typically opened with childhood memories of accidents in the pit which 
would involve close family and friends. In his autobiography Incorrigible 
Rebel, Arthur Horner, General Secretary of the NUM from 1946 to 1959, set 
the tone when he wrote,  
From my earliest childhood […] I felt the shadows of the pits […] Then one 
Sunday, somebody left a ventilator door open in the Glynmeal Level, and my 
grandfather, going in at the evening to examine the pit, was blown to pieces 
by an explosion. They collected his remains with a rake, and brought them 
home in a sack […]. I learned very early that there was blood on the coal 
(Horner 1960, 11).  
Twenty years later, Joe Gormely, President of the Union from 1971 to 1982, 
struck a similar chord in his autobiography, Battered Cherub:  
It was to be only six more years [after the young Gormley’s first experience of 
mining at the age of 10, JA] before I knew those dangers for real, when I 
brought my first dead colleague out of a mine. He was a collier, and a huge 
stone had fallen on him and killed him outright. Then I understood. The un-
derstanding was helped when my father died down the mine, and then later 
when my son was badly injured down the mine (Gormley 1982, 2).  
While the examples can be considered indicative of the literary conventions 
governing the genre of miners’ memoirs, they also point to the very real expe-
riential basis to the trope of “blood on the coal.” They describe as a regular 
occurrence events that were, by definition, extraordinary, and not only in the 
distant past or in faraway countries. In 1947, the first year after the nationalisa-
tion of the industry, 612 coal miners were killed down the pit. And although 
1947 was rather unusual, well over one hundred people would get killed year 
after year in the two decades that followed (Ashworth 1986, 556). And yet, by 
the time “The Ballad of Springhill” reached a mass audience in the rendition of 
Irish rock band U2 in 1987, British coal mines had become a much safer place 
indeed. As the official history of the British coal industry notes,  
Most of the improvement dated from the later sixties, i.e. from the time when 
modern mechanised methods had become general and familiar, and many of 
the most antiquated pits had been closed; and there was further improvement 
in the later seventies (Ashworth 1986, 557).  
By the 1970s, a gap had opened up between the social reality of health hazards 
in the industry, on one hand, and popular representations, on the other: Popular 
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culture continued to trade in images of coal mining – “bone and blood is the 
price of coal” – that, although not entirely superseded, had become much less 
common. In some respects, the popular image of the coal miner had started to 
take on a life of its own, revelling in the dangers to which coal miners had been 
exposed in the past and glorifying them. This was recognised by some observ-
ers at the time. In a House of Commons debate on the coal dispute of 1972, 
Conservative MP Peter Fry, for example, commented, “I have seen the condi-
tions under which miners have to work. It is still a dangerous and dirty job, 
though not quite as bad as the public image has it – which owes too much to 
reissues of ‘How Green was my Valley.’”8 At the same time, the argument can 
easily be overstretched. In the 1970s, there occurred seven accidents during 
which more than five miners were killed each, at Cynheidre-Pentremawr 
(1971), Lofthouse, Seafield, and Markham (1973), Houghton Main (1975), 
Bentley (1978) and Golborne (1979).9   
While accidents and disasters were perhaps the most well-known dangers in 
the industry, they were not the only ones. The risk of contracting an industrial 
disease was far more widespread. Particularly dangerous was pneumoconiosis 
or miner’s lung – a scarring of the lung tissue caused by the persistent inhala-
tion of coal dust. In the words of historians Arthur McIvor and Ronald John-
ston, miner’s lung represented “the largest occupational health disaster in Brit-
ish history.” It claimed 40,000 lives between 1930 and 1990 (McIvor and 
Johnston 2007, 2 and 54). The poem “Pneumoconiosis,” written by Welsh poet 
Duncan Bush and published in 1985, captures well the nature of the disease as 
a condition that accumulates over long periods of work underground and which 
progressively disables the sufferer (Bush 1985, 25). “This is The Dust: / black 
diamond dust / I had thirty years in it, boy, / a laughing red mouth / coming up 
to spit smuts black / into a handkerchief,” the poem opens. “I take things pretty 
easy, these days; one step at a time. / Especially the stairs,” the lyrical “I” 
comments sarcastically. The disease was also incurable, in its worst form slow-
ly strangling the sufferer, leading to a painful death. As the last stanza put it, “I 
saw my own brother: rising, / dying in panic, gasping / worse than a hooked / 
carp drowning in air. / Every breath was his last / till the last.” 
Although the poem adopts the voice of the first person singular, it is a work 
of art rather than of autobiography. The author Duncan Bush, while hailing 
from Wales, had no first-hand experience of mining, but received his education 
in seminar rooms at the Universities of Warwick, Duke (North Carolina) and 
Oxford. The condition that Bush described was widespread in mining villages, 
but miners themselves did not tend to talk about it through the medium of lyri-
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cal poetry. Arthur Horner, for example, speaks rather more prosaically of the 
“men with the deadly dust in their lungs, waiting only for death” as a constant 
presence during his childhood at the turn of the twentieth century. Likewise, 
Labour MP Eric Varley, Secretary of State for Energy from 1974 to 1975, 
recalled “the rasping pneumoconiotic cough which has been my father’s keep-
sake for 50 years’ work in the coal mining industry” (Department of Energy 
1974a, 1).  
Rather than as a direct reflection of lived experience, the poem is perhaps 
better understood as another indication of the special cultural resonance that 
coal mining and coal miners enjoyed in the UK. This fascination fed on images 
that were largely drawn from the past; it appears to have shifted from the cul-
tural mainstream to the counter-cultural margin over the course of the 1970s 
and 1980s. This disjuncture between memories of past dangers and present 
conditions was recognised not just by Conservative politicians such as Peter 
Fry mentioned above, but by miners’ leaders themselves. In contrast to some 
outside observers, however, miners did not bemoan the demise of the sacrificial 
side of mining, but took it as evidence of successful struggles and of the pro-
gress that had been achieved since the nationalisation of the industry in 1947. 
To be sure, there was still a long way to go until mining could be considered an 
occupation like any other, but much had been achieved. As Horner noted in 
1960, “Today we have secured great advances in safety measures, but the fear 
of sudden death or mutilation still hangs over the miners and is felt in every 
mining village” (Horner 1960, 11). While the miners’ leader readily acknowl-
edged the progress that had been made in the management of risk since his 
childhood days, he also stressed that memories of past disasters could cast a 
long shadow, inducing powerful fears among mining communities that lingered 
on in the present.  
3.  “Blood on the Coal” as Political Resource  
While the cultural resonance of coal miners as deserving of admiration and 
sympathy remained strong throughout the two decades of the 1970s and 1980s, 
the political bargaining power of the “blood on the coal” image decreased 
significantly, as a close reading of selected debates in the House of Commons 
on the industrial disputes of the 1970s and 1980s makes clear.  
The coal strikes of 1972 and 1974 were, in the first instance, conflicts be-
tween capital and labour, which, in this case, were represented by the NCB on 
the one side and the NUM on the other. Yet, the strikes, which lasted form 8 
January 1972 to 28 February 1972 and from 9 February 1974 to 11 March 
1974, respectively, quickly acquired a political dimension, drawing in the Con-
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servative government under Edward Heath.10 This was partly due to the nature 
of the British coal industry, which had been nationalised in 1947. The terms of 
nationalisation required the Coal Board to seek recourse to government funding 
in order to finance investment programmes and, as was the case in 1972, large 
wage claims of the workforce. The considerable pay rise for which the miners 
struck was also feared to have a knock-on effect on other sectors of industry. 
The demand was thus perceived as a challenge to government economic policy, 
which aimed to curb inflation. The main reason, however, lay in the effective-
ness of the strikes, which not only stopped the production of coal, but also, 
through picketing, succeeded in preventing the movement of coal to the power 
stations. In both instances, the government was forced into adopting emergency 
measures to maintain the supply of essential services, such as introducing pow-
er cuts and putting industry on a three-day week. In February 1974, a belea-
guered government saw no other solution but to call a general election under 
the heading of, “Who governs Britain?”   
Both strikes were debated extensively in Parliament. Reading the debates 
from the early 1970s it is remarkable just how widely the underlying sentiment 
about the character of coal miners and the nature of their work was shared 
across the floor of the House, despite contrasting views on the justification of 
the coal strike. The miners commanded sympathy and respect not just among 
their “natural” supporters in the Parliamentary Labour Party, but also Con-
servative backbenchers and even ministers of the Heath administration. This 
was despite the fact that the government had opposed the strike from the be-
ginning and was increasingly alarmed over the broader political and societal 
consequences.  
In a debate on 18 January 1972, for example, the Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry, John Davies, sought to put across the government’s view 
that the strike action was unjustified and likely to cause “self-inflicted wounds” 
to the industry as well as “great inconvenience” to the public at large.11 Yet he 
felt compelled to open his speech with a declaration of respect for coal miners, 
stressing that “the men who work in [the coal industry] rightly evoke our sym-
pathy and admiration.” “Sympathy and admiration” grew out of what Davies 
called – rather tersely – “the character of the industry – with its ruggedness and 
dangers.”12 Similar sentiments were expressed on the Conservative backbench-
es. Geoffrey Stewart-Smith, MP for Belper in Derbyshire, declared that  
                                                             
10  For an account of the strikes from the Coal Board’s perspective, see Ashworth (1986, 289-
316, 329-41). For an account focusing on the NUM see Taylor (2005, 49-109). For the gov-
ernment’s perspective see the autobiographical account by Edward Heath (Heath 1998, 349-
53, 503-16). 
11  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 18 January 1972, coll. 228-37, here 231 and 236 (for 
the quotations). 
12  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 18 January 1972, coll. 228. 
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one must have sympathy with [the miners] […]. They work in conditions of 
damp and wet. They spend one-third of their lives underground. They have to 
compete with gas, fires, pneumoconiosis, bronchitis, and all the other hazards. 
They have a quiet courage which […] enables them to follow this dangerous 
way of life every day.13   
As was to be expected in view of the close links between the industrial and 
political wings of the British labour movement, members of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party waxed lyrical about the nature of coal mining. In one passionate 
contribution the MP for Derbyshire North-East, Thomas Swain, explicitly 
invoked the health hazards in order to push the case for coal: “Let us look at the 
price that is paid in human terms,” he exclaimed.  
In 1972, 92 men were killed in the coal mines of Great Britain – nearly two a 
week; since 1947 6,500 men have lost their lives underground in the coal 
mines. This is the story in human terms. This is the other side of the picture 
when one considers the price of coal. No economist in the world can measure 
the price of coal in money terms without bearing in mind the human terms in 
loss of life.14  
Swain gave additional weight to these figures by drawing on his own lived 
experience, telling the House that he had worked in a pit for 34 years and that 
his own father had been killed down a pit. 
In the context of the national coal strike of 1972, the argument that miners 
were entitled to special treatment due to the dirty and dangerous nature of their 
work carried much conviction across the political spectrum. It also featured 
prominently in the conclusions reached by the independent Court of Inquiry 
chaired by Lord Wilberforce, which would eventually settle the strike on the 
union’s terms. “Other occupations have their dangers and inconveniences, but we 
know of none in which there is such a combination of danger, health hazard, 
discomfort in working conditions, social inconvenience and community isola-
tion,” as the Court of Inquiry put it (A Special Case 1972, 123-44, here 133).  
If the trope of “blood on the coal” was politically useful in the 1970s, it was, 
however, also a double-edged sword, and potentially damaging to the miners’ 
cause, as was recognised by the Conservative MP Sir Anthony Meyer. In his 
contribution to the debate on 18 January 1972, Meyer, too, paid tribute to the 
miners, declaring that “the miners deserve our sympathy for the dangerous job 
they do.” Yet, at the same time, he cautioned that occupational health hazards 
were an ambiguous political asset: “We should be careful, because if we were 
to follow too far the […] emotional line […] it would lead inevitably to the 
conclusion that mining was so dangerous that it should be forbidden, as send-
ing children up chimneys was forbidden.”15 This ambivalence was shared by 
                                                             
13  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 18 January 1972, coll. 274. 
14  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 18 January 1972, col. 290 et seq. 
15  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 18 January 1972, col. 314. 
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Her Majesty’s Opposition as well. In December 1973, during a parliamentary 
debate on the general economic and energy situation and with another national 
coal strike looming, the Labour MP Roy Mason ended his passionate defence 
of the miners’ cause on a personal note. He told the House of the 14 years that 
he had spent down the pit and of the “awful memories” he held of this time. He 
had seen men killed by his side and his father crippled for life. “Working un-
derground in a coal mine is not a life for any man,” Mason exclaimed.  
It is not fair on his wife. It is not fair on his family. It is a pity that we cannot 
close all the mines tomorrow-but we cannot. The nation depends upon them. 
That is why we must pay the miners, and pay them well, until that day of the 
final closure gloriously arrives.16 
As Mason’s intervention made clear, the force of the “blood on the coal” argu-
ment hinged on the premise that coal mining was not just dangerous, but also 
beneficial, and indeed essential, to society at large – and not just historically, 
but also in the present and the future. Miners braved great dangers, turning them 
into heroes and victims, not out of romantic adventurism, but because industrial 
society depended on the availability of a steady supply of coal. With around two 
thirds of the nation’s electricity supply generated by the burning of coal, Mason’s 
premise was still grounded in social reality in the early 1970s (Ministry of Power 
1967, 285; Department of Energy 1974a, 7). However much the market share of 
coal had declined since the late 1950s and however outmoded the fossil fuel 
seemed in comparison to oil, natural gas and nuclear power, the normal function-
ing of British society could not be sustained for long if the coal miners collec-
tively decided to withdraw their labour. This lesson was brought home to poli-
cy makers and the public at large by the power cuts that the government felt 
impelled to introduce during the coal strikes of 1972 and 1974.  
Ten years later, by the time of the miners’ strike of 1984/85, the nature of 
the debate on risk and coal mining had changed.17 No longer did the view 
command cross-party support that coal miners, whatever the merits of their 
specific demands, were deserving of admiration and sympathy. Rather, there 
had emerged a powerful competing narrative which held that the real danger 
lay not with hazardous working conditions, but with the miners themselves. 
They were portrayed as “wreckers” and dangerous subversives embarked on an 
“insurrectionary” course who must be stopped in their tracks lest Britain be-
come ungovernable. Risk in this sense was expounded most famously by the 
Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, herself. In a speech held before a Commit-
tee of backbench MPs on 19 July 1984, she spoke of miners’ leaders as “the 
enemy within” who were “just as dangerous [as the enemy without] but more 
                                                             
16  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 19 December 1973, col. 1390 et seq. 
17  For a history of the strike from the perspective of the NUM see Taylor (2005, 173-234); for 
an account from the government’s perspective see Thatcher (1993, 339-78). For the refusal 
of Nottinghamshire miners to join in the strike see now: Amos (2015).  
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difficult to fight.” For emphasis, the speaking notes added the repetition, “But 
just as dangerous to liberty / Scar across the face of our country.”18 While the 
Prime Minister expressed her verdict in characteristically uncompromising 
terms, the underlying sentiment itself was hardly new. Ever since the re-
emergence of industrial conflict in the coal industry in the late 1960s, self-styled 
“militants” had been labelled as “wreckers,” “enemies” and “subversives” by 
their opponents both inside and outside the labour movement. No less a figure 
than Joe Gormley himself, president of the NUM from 1971 to 1982, spoke of 
“wreckers” and “antis” when describing the conflicts inside the Union over the 
question of incentive schemes and wage claims in the period following the suc-
cessful strikes of 1972 and 1974 (Gormely 1982, 146-72).19 To some extent, 
Conservative vilification of striking coal miners in 1984/85 could draw upon 
discursive practices which the NUM itself had helped to popularise during the 
internecine struggles of the 1970s. Likewise, miners’ leaders had contributed to 
blunting the force of the “blood on the coal” argument by invoking it in the 
internal debate over productivity schemes (Parkin 1974; Routledge 1974). 
The Thatcher government’s perception of coal miners as the “real” danger 
was in part a legacy of the bitter memories left by the strikes of the early 1970s, 
which were deemed to have caused the downfall of the previous Conservative 
government. Yet arguably more important still were the events of February 
1981 when the National Coal Board hastily withdrew a programme of pit clo-
sures in the face of a strike threat by the NUM (Ashworth 1986, 430-43). The 
sudden policy reversal was widely interpreted as a humiliation not just for 
management, but the Conservative government itself, whose Coal Industry Act 
of 1980 had put severe pressure on the Board to bring down costs. As the left-
leaning sociologist Vic Allen commented in a piece called, “The Miners on the 
Move” in the journal Marxism Today: “Even the Thatcher government has 
bowed before the miners.” What was more, the government’s response to the 
strike threat, he argued, “contained all the elements of hysteria which had 
marked Heath’s behaviour in 1973” (Allen 1982, 17).  
Allen’s assessment, minus the sense of satisfaction, was shared inside the 
government. Influential government advisor and head of the Policy Unit, John 
Hoskyns, considered the withdrawal of the closure programme as a major de-
feat, as he made clear in a note to the Prime Minister on 27 March 1981. While 
“even before the election, it had been clear to anyone that the NUM posed a 
serious threat to the government,” recent developments had called into doubt 
                                                             
18  Margaret Thatcher, “Speech to 1922 Committee”, 19 July 1984 <http://www.margaret 
thatcher.org./document/105563> (Accessed June, 23 2015); “Thatcher makes Falklands link: 
attack on ‘enemy within,’” 1984, The Times, July 20. 
19  Lord Robens, chairman of the NCB during the 1960s and ex-Labour MP and government 
minister, likewise wrote of “subversive[s]” who were “out to damage not only the industry, 
but the country as a whole” in his autobiography in 1972 (Robens 1972, 33). 
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the government’s authority and strengthened the position of the union.20 The 
Cabinet’s official think tank, the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS), con-
curred in a note composed six weeks later.  
The withdrawal of the accelerated closure programme has greatly weakened 
the government’s position. It has left the NUM with the initiative on all fronts 
[…]. The danger is not confined to coal. It is undermining the credibility of 
the Government’s whole stance on economic and industrial policy.21  
In the estimation of senior advisors, then, the Thatcher government had been 
humiliated at the hands of the NUM, with collateral damage extending far 
beyond the coal industry itself. After all, the Conservatives had returned to 
power in 1979 on the promise that they would initiate a “new beginning” by 
controlling public expenditure, standing up to the trade unions and “restor[ing] 
incentives so that hard work pays” (Conservative Party General Election Mani-
festos 2000, 266).  
In the aftermath of the U-turn on the coal industry, the government made fran-
tic efforts to define the precise nature of the danger and to devise a strategy capa-
ble of blunting in future what was described as “NUM power.” A memorandum 
by the Policy Unit, dated 22 May 1981, identified the ability of mineworkers to 
project an image of themselves that commanded the respect and sympathy of 
the British public as one of the sources of their power. “Even though Scargill 
may be the ideal NUM figurehead [for the government on account of his radi-
calism], the fact remains that miners are seen to be (and most people with any 
direct contact would say they are) the ‘salt of the earth,”’ the paper conceded. 
The caveat in brackets was revealing, for it allowed for the possibility that the 
miners’ special qualities might be more than a matter of skilful self-projection, 
but indeed be rooted in social being, making them an even more formidable 
opponent.22 The memorandum suggested that the government take steps to 
undermine this image or at least to neutralise it. “Could we take out some in-
surance against grievance building up and public sympathy for the miners by, 
for example, a much publicised visit to a mine, perhaps in one of the most 
hard-hit areas, by the Prime Minister?” 
The Treasury, in another contribution to the debate, argued along similar 
lines, but took a more forceful stance. It pressed the case for  
mounting […] a major PR campaign on the costs imposed on the taxpayer by 
the coal industry. Its aim would be to bring home to the British public that the 
inefficiencies of the NCB, together with the attitude of the miners to such 
questions as closing down the high cost uneconomic pits […] are imposing a 
                                                             
20  “Lessons of the NUM strike threat,” March 27, 1981, The National Archives [TNA], PREM 
19/540. 
21  “Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Economic Strategy / NCB finances / Note by CPRS,” May 
11, 1981, TNA, PREM 19/540. 
22  “The NCB/NUM problem,” May 22, 1981, TNA, PREM 19/540. 
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real growing burden on the economy. […] The NCB and the NUM will be 
able to hold the nation to ransom unless the pressures of public opinion can be 
brought to bear upon the industry to modernise itself.23  
The idea that the government needed to “operate on public opinion” in addition 
to taking more specific measures such as increasing coal stocks at power sta-
tions and switching to oil burn also found its way into a major study on “the 
NUM/NCB problem” that the CPRS had co-written with the Policy Unit and 
which was presented to the Prime Minister on 31 July 1981.24 As the study 
made clear, “The government needs to counter a public tendency to sympathise 
with the miners, based on the history of the mining industry, and bad condi-
tions under which underground miners still work, and – since the energy crisis 
on the importance of British coal.”  
When the strike finally came, in March 1984, the Thatcher government was 
ready and a communication strategy in place. Much was made during the con-
flict of the notion that, from a fiscal perspective, the nationalised coal industry 
had turned from an asset into a liability. As the Conservative MP for Ludlow, 
Eric Cockeram, exclaimed in an acrimonious debate in the House of Commons 
on 26 November 1984, “It is time that the miners were told that they cannot 
expect endless subsidies from working people earning less than they earn.”25 
Miners were recast in the role of privileged (and ungrateful) recipients of “tax-
payers’ money” rather than in their apprised role of hard-working people who 
were prepared to sacrifice limb and life for the benefit of the nation (note the 
juxtaposition of miners to “working people” in the quotation). Viewed from 
this angle, miners seemed less deserving of admiration than of scorn; they were 
more akin to “benefit scroungers” than “best men in the world.”  
Against this backdrop, the NUM’s argument that the strike was about the 
preservation of a way of life, was met with derision by Conservative MPs, and 
the “blood on the coal” trope turned on its head: As the MP for Sherwood, 
Andy Stewart put it in the House on 28 March 1984:  
We hear that this dispute is about jobs for our children and grandchildren. Are 
those people saying that in the year 2020 we shall be sending more people 
down holes in the ground than we are now? What a Luddite vision! Have 
they not heard of technology, or are they so blinkered that they have not no-
ticed the disappearance of the pit pony? […] If every miner's wife had one 
wish, it […] would be that her children would never have to go down the pit 
to earn a living.26  
Or, as the Conservative MP for Cannock & Burntwood, Gerald Howarth, re-
marked sarcastically in the same debate,  
                                                             
23  “NCB Finances,” May 13, 1981, TNA, PREM 19/540. 
24  “CPRS Study of the NUM/NCB problem,” July 31, 1981, TNA, PREM 19/541. 
25  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 26 November 1984, col. 743 et seq. 
26  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 7 June 1984, coll. 473-475. 
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Are the Opposition seriously suggesting that output should be increased from 
100 million tonnes to 135 million tonnes? What will we do with the stock-
piles? […] Is it to be poured back down the pits to be pulled out again by 
young miners to allow them to become ill with pit diseases?27 
In some respects, the two Conservative backbenchers articulated the same 
vision that Labour MP and ex-miner Roy Mason had expounded in December 
1973. Yet the implications for mineworkers under which the arrival of “the day 
of the final closure gloriously” was imagined could not have been more differ-
ent. Whereas one vision pictured heroes who would live out their retirement in 
material comfort and be amply rewarded for their sacrifice by the gratitude of 
society, the second vision pictured dispossessed industrial proletarians cast 
aside by progress before their time, left to scrape by as best as they could under 
the mistrustful gaze of the guardians of the public purse. 
4.  Conclusion 
By the time that radical historian Raphael Samuel described British coal miners 
as engaged, “in the last analysis, in daily wager with death” in 1985, safety in 
the industry had become much improved, but memories of past hazards contin-
ued to command a strong pop-cultural and counter-cultural resonance. Yet, at 
the centre of the political decision-making process, dangerous working condi-
tions past and present no longer bestowed sympathy and respect, but were 
referred to as yet another example that British coal mining, in the words of 
Margaret Thatcher, “had come to symbolize everything that was wrong with 
Britain” (Thatcher 1993, 340). From this perspective, it was the miners them-
selves, or at least their leaders, who had turned into a risk for the well-being, 
and indeed survival, of Britain as a prosperous capitalist nation and stable 
parliamentary democracy.   
Thirty years later, the nature of the debate on coal and risk had changed 
again. On 17 March 2015, The Guardian launched its “Keep it in the Ground” 
appeal.28 The public campaign was designed to put pressure on two major 
charitable organisations to disinvest from the 200 leading fossil fuel companies 
in order to help prevent climate change.29 To this end, readers were urged to 
sign a petition which insisted that it was “morally and financially misguided to 
invest in companies dedicated to finding and burning more oil, gas and coal.” 
                                                             
27  Hansard, House of Commons Sitting of 7 June 1984, coll. 494.  
28  Alan Rusbridger, 2015, “These are the most polluting coal, gas & oil companies in the world. 
Are you helping to fund them?,” The Guardian, March 17. For a critique see Matt Ridley, 
2015, “This demonising of fossil fuels is madness,” The Times, May 18. 
29  For the historical background of the debate on the link between global warming and coal 
see: Freese (2003, 182-97); for earlier debates on coal as a pollutant ibid., passim and 
Thorsheim (2006).  
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In the editorial explaining the rationale behind the campaign, Alan Rusbridger, 
the newspaper’s editor-in-chief, stressed the great hazards for mankind that 
were posed by the continued extraction and burning of fossil fuels. Conjuring 
up a temporal horizon of one generation, he underlined the need for immediate 
action: “If we and our children are to have a reasonable chance of living stable 
and secure lives 30 or so years from now, according to one recent study 80% of 
the known coal reserves will have to stay underground, along with half the gas 
and a third of the oil reserves.” The campaign was illustrated visually by a 
black hexagon inside a brown square, presumably symbolising coal lying bur-
ied in the ground.  
Around the same time that the appeal was launched, The Guardian did not 
just look into the future, but also into the past, commemorating the thirtieth 
anniversary of the great miners’ strike of 1984/5. Yet the newspaper drew no 
connection between the “Keep it in the Ground” appeal of 2015 and the strug-
gle of 1984/85, which had been waged under the slogan of “Coal not Dole.” 
Indeed, the industry in defence of which the miners had struck was hardly 
mentioned at all. Instead, the anniversary reporting focused on the theme of 
“community” and the changes that the strike had wrought. In a so-called “wit-
ness blog,” readers were invited to tell their stories and share their memories. 
The website presenting a digest of the responses was captioned by the quota-
tion, “I fought not just for ‘my pit,’ but for the community.” Meanwhile, prom-
inent Guardian columnist Seumas Milne castigated the government of the day 
for their “scorched earth onslaught on Britain’s mining communities” while 
Owen Jones found inspiration in the unlikely alliance that had been forged 
during the strike between mining communities and the Gays and Lesbian 
Rights Movement, as celebrated in the 2014 feature film Pride.30 
The Guardian thus managed to celebrate the struggle and sacrifice of histor-
ical coal miners while at the same time exposing as a threat to the survival of 
mankind the very practice around which their lives had revolved and for which 
they had struck, the extraction from the ground, under often extremely danger-
ous conditions, of the fossil fuel coal. The campaign was indicative of broader 
shifts in British culture, in which the heritage of coal mining was cherished and 
the historical miners, along with ethnic and sexual minorities, depicted as vic-
tims of Thatcherism, while the ongoing risks of coal mining (and other dirty 
and hazardous occupations) were left to be borne by others living in countries 
far away. 
                                                             
30  “The miners’ strike 1984-85,” 2015, The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 
miners-strike-1984-85> (Accessed April 23, 2015). 
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